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Abstract
Background: The Syrian armed conflict is the worst humanitarian tragedy this century. With approximately 470,000
deaths and more than 13 million people displaced, the conflict continues to have a devastating impact on the
health system and health outcomes within the country. Hundreds of international and national non-governmental
organisations, as well as United Nations agencies have responded to the humanitarian crisis in Syria. While there
has been significant attention on the challenges of meeting health needs of Syrian refugees in neighbouring
countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, very little has been documented about the humanitarian challenges
within Syria, between 2013 and 2014 when non-governmental organisations operated in Syria with very little
United Nations support or leadership, particularly around obtaining information to guide health responses in Syria.
Methods: In this study, we draw on our operational experience in Syria and analyse data collected for the
humanitarian health response in contested and opposition-held areas of Syria in 2013–4 from Turkey, where
the largest humanitarian operation for Syria was based. This is combined with academic literature and material
from open-access reports.
Results: Humanitarian needs have consistently been most acute in contested and opposition-held areas of
Syria due to break-down of Government of Syria services and intense warfare. Humanitarian organisations had
to establish de novo data collection systems independent of the Government of Syria to provide essential
services in opposition-held and contested areas of Syria. The use of technology such as social media was vital
to facilitating remote data collection in Syria as many humanitarian agencies operated with a limited operational
visibility given chronic levels of insecurity. Mortality data have been highly politicized and extremely difficult to verify,
particularly in areas highly affected by the conflict, with shifting frontlines, populations, and allegiances.
Conclusions: More investment in data collection and use, technological investment in the use of M- and E-health,
capacity building and strong technical and independent leadership should be a key priority for the humanitarian
health response in Syria and other emergencies. Much more attention should be also given for the treatment gap for
non-communicable diseases including mental disorders.
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Background
The Syrian armed conflict which began in 2011 is the
deadliest of recent wars and the worst humanitarian ca-
tastrophe this century. Estimates suggest that more than
470,000 people have died according to a report pubished
by the Syrian Centre for Policy Research in February
2016 – this number has likely to have increased al-
though there are no recent reports [1]. More than 13
out of 23 million Syrians have been displaced both in-
ternally and externally [2–4]. Widespread crimes against
humanity have been committed by Government of Syria
(GoS) and opposition forces [5, 6]. Control of the coun-
try is currently divided among the GoS, Islamic State
(ISIS), Kurdish forces and a variety of armed opposition
forces [7, 8].
Syria has become one of the most dangerous places
for healthcare providers – a strategy described as the
weaponisation of healthcare in a recent study has meant
that hundreds of healthcare workers have been killed
and/or tortured, and several health facilities deliberately
destroyed [9]. As a result, Syria’s health system has been
impacted catastrophically, with supply lines interrupted,
and a general degradation of key services [10]. The eco-
nomic cost of the conflict is estimated to be £175bn
($255bn). The Syrian conflict continues to have dire
socio-economic consequences with 82.5% of Syrians liv-
ing in poverty and life expectancy having decreased from
70 years (2010) to 55.4 years (2015) [1].
Hundreds of international and national non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as United
Nations (UN) agencies are responding to this crisis.
The humanitarian response for inside Syria has been
largely managed either from within Syria or from
neighbouring countries, particularly Turkey. Needs
have consistently been most acute in contested and
opposition-held areas of Syria due to breakdown of
GoS services and intense warfare. The delivery of hu-
manitarian aid to these areas has been severely hin-
dered by insecurity, the GoS (which prohibited most
non-UN actors from operating legally) and lack of
leadership from the UN. As a result, many inter-
national NGOs have had to operate remotely through
local implementing partners [11]. In 2014, the UN fi-
nally authorised its agencies to use named border
crossings into Syria for humanitarian aid without con-
sent from the GoS [12, 13]. This enabled the World
Health Organisation (WHO) and other UN agencies
to be more visible and engaged throughout Syria.
However, between 2013 and 2014 NGOs operated in
Syria with very little UN support or leadership, and
very little is known about the challenges of the hu-
manitarian health response during this time.
During conflict, data on mortality, morbidity and
health services are essential for establishing needs,
designing and evaluating humanitarian interventions and
documenting health impacts on civilians for historical
but also real-time advocacy uses with donors and parties
to the conflict. Such data should also be collected to sup-
port timely and appropriate public health action [14, 15].
To date, most data on war-affected Syrians have been gen-
erated among refugee populations in Lebanon, Jordan and
Turkey [16–37]. Little substantive public health analysis
has been published for populations living inside Syria,
particularly those in contested and opposition-held
areas [38, 39]. For example, a Pubmed search showed
only seven publications on health inside Syria since
the war began [9, 39–45]. Generally, there is substan-
tially greater evidence on health needs of refugees
than those of populations trapped within conflict-
affected countries.
Context of data collection
Up until the end of 2014, NGOs operated in contested
and opposition-held areas from neighbouring countries
with very limited UN guidance and support, and no for-
mal coordination mechanism. Endorsed by reform of the
humanitarian system in 2005, the Cluster Approach aims
to improve coordination, leadership and accountability
of different humanitarian sectors such as health, nutri-
tion, protection, and logistics. Clusters are partnerships
of humanitarian organizations, both UN and non-UN
[46]. In 2013–2014, clusters had not formally been acti-
vated by the UN for the cross-border response, despite
Syria being classified as level three (i.e. highest) in the
UN emergency grading. This failure to institute standard
coordination mechanisms and the very limited presence
of UN agencies, who lead most humanitarian clusters, in
opposition and contested-areas of Syria, has been criti-
cised elsewhere [47]. In particular, the World Health
Organization (WHO)‘s close working relationship with
GoS Ministry of Health (MoH), and conflicting man-
dates of agency coordination as well as host government
assistance, meant that it was not directly involved in co-
ordination mechanisms for the humanitarian health re-
sponse led from Turkey, and did not undertake or
oversee vital public health information activities [47–49].
Instead, national and international NGOs set up a
Health Working Group (HWG; now known as the NGO
Forum for Non-Governmental Organisations Operating
in northern Syria) in mid-2013 to provide coordination
and information exchange for cross-border humanitarian
health interventions from southern Turkey.
The HWG attempted to replicate typical health cluster
ways of working, and engaged with the Interim Ministry
of Health set up by the Syrian opposition. Many agencies
operated with a limited presence and visibility, partly
due to delays in obtaining formal registration from
Turkish authorities. In terms of public health data, the
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HWG had to establish de novo data collection systems
independent of those in GoS areas, since there were no for-
mal open channels of communication with the actors work-
ing in GoS controlled areas. Most data collection activities
reviewed in this study were undertaken by the HWG.
This paper reviews the collection, analysis and use of
public health data in contested and opposition-held areas
of Syria in 2013 and 2014, as a major case study of chal-
lenges in such contexts, and recommends improvements
based on the Syrian experience. When considering different
public health information needs, we broadly follow the
framework set out in a recent study by Checchi et al. [50].
Methods
The study draws on the multiple operational experiences
of the authors as humanitarian health professionals
working in the Health Working Group (NGOs based in
Turkey), the Syrian Strategic Needs Analysis Project
(SNAP) (which supports the humanitarian response in
Syria by providing independent analysis and supporting
coordinated assessments), and the Assistance Coordin-
ation Unit (an NGO coordination body which set up the
Early Warning Alert and Response Network (EWARN).
More specifically, ED was the Public Health Information
Manager with the Health Working Group in Turkey;
WW was the lead analyst for SNAP and an assessment
coordinator for the food security cluster in Gaziantep,
Turkey; RS is a non-communicable diseases and health
policy expert; GA has worked in Turkey to support the
Syrian Immunisation Task Force; AW is a public health
information specialist and has worked in many large
scale humanitarian health crises; MW is a Syrian paedia-
trician working with EWARN and managing its nutri-
tion component; MJ is a Syrian medical expert and
manages EWARN; AK is a Syrian medical doctor and
epidemiologist who led the health response in north-
west Syria with Save the Children; RC is senior humani-
tarian health advisor at Save the Children; and PP is a
social scientist conducting research and capacity-
building work in conflict-affected countries.
We also reviewed data from publically available re-
ports such as Multi-Sector Initial Rapid Assessments
(MIRA), Dynamic Monitoring System (DYNAMO), Joint
Rapid Assessments in northern Syria (JRANS) and indi-
vidual non-governmental NGOs. This was supplemented
with academic and grey literature from PubMed, Relief-
web and Google using search terms such as Syria, con-
flict, war, health, health information, humanitarian, data,
diseases and health system.
Results
Affected population size and general needs assessment
In contested and opposition-held areas of Syria throughout
2013–4, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) produced administrative
district profiles on a bi-annual basis without specifying any
of the methods used. Information about population size
was also collected by humanitarian agencies through con-
secutive Multi-Sector Initial Rapid Assessments (MIRA),
coordinated by UNOCHA and designed to identify priori-
ties during the first weeks following an emergency [51–53].
These very lengthy assessments (1109 variables of which
149 were for health) relied on a mix of primary and second-
ary data, the former collected by Syrian interviewers super-
vised remotely and consisting of structured questionnaires,
community information interviews and focus groups se-
lected through convenience sampling. To minimise risk for
interviewers and respondents, recording of responses was
minimised and instead, qualitative data were tran-
scribed during extensive debriefing of interviewers.
Among other topics, the MIRA explored population
displacement dynamics [54].
In addition to MIRA, a more abridged, multi-sector
needs monitoring exercise (DYNAMO) was carried out
from March 2014 with irregular (every 2–5 months) fre-
quency by the Assistance Coordination Unit, a Syrian
NGO umbrella body based in Turkey, in areas it accessed
[55]. DYNAMO was also remotely implemented and reli-
ant on convenience sampling, though emphasis was placed
on validating and cross-checking information on attacks
and major events experienced by the population [56].
The main limitations of MIRA and DYNAMO were
that they initially sought to collect an unwieldy amount
of information, resulting in unclear quality of responses,
long delays (particularly for MIRA) in implementation,
analysis and publication, and difficulty in longitudinal
comparisons due to questionnaire changes. These were,
however, the main instruments available to obtain a
comprehensive insight into the needs of people inside
opposition-held and contested areas of Syria.
Public health risks
Exposure to armed attacks
Exposure to attacks can be recorded through different
methods such as population surveys, media and human
rights activist reports, hospital records, and capture-
recapture statistics [57]. In addition, the humanitarian
protection cluster has developed standardized reporting
forms that feed into an event-based surveillance system.
In the humanitarian response led from Turkey in 2013–4,
such data were collected predominantly through social
media reports, particularly as they concerned assaults on
hospitals, doctors, and patients [58, 59]. In 2014, for ex-
ample, Physicians for Human Rights documented 224 at-
tacks on medical facilities and 600 deaths of medical
personnel in Syria since the start of the conflict [60, 61].
Violations against human rights and international hu-
manitarian law, including cases of attacks against medical
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personnel and facilities, injuries and sexual and gender-
based violence, were at times shared with the protection
sector or human rights actors. However, accurate esti-
mates of population exposure to armed attacks were not
obtained, as these would have necessitated more detailed
methods such as self-reporting household sample surveys
[62]. Most agencies had limited capacity to carry out such
surveys, and furthermore they would have entailed data
collection in extremely insecure conditions, with limited
provisions for minimising the possible untoward effects
for data collectors or respondents of collecting or sharing
sensitive information on attacks.
Disease burden: Proportional morbidity
Data on proportional morbidity in health facilities are
typically available via a Health Information System
(HIS). In contested and opposition-held areas of Syria in
2013–4 such a system was neither systematic nor stan-
dardised. Different NGOs set up individual data collec-
tion systems for their own programmatic needs, often
collecting data that had not been defined or compiled
using uniform standards and definitions. This made
reporting, monitoring and evaluation difficult. No overall
HIS reporting was set up largely due to lack of capacity
and leadership in the Health Working Group. Although
considerable time and effort was devoted to developing
the use of a shared, web-based open-source health infor-
mation system application DHIS-2 (https://www.dhis2.org),
lack of translation into Arabic curtailed its usability inside
Syria [63].
Disease burden: Epidemic occurrence
In order to detect epidemic risk and occurrence, the As-
sistance Coordination Unit (ACU) a NGO Coordination
body based in Turkey and belonging to the humanitarian
section of Syrian National Coalition set up an Early
Warning Alert and Response Network (EWARN) system
in 2013, following the WHO EWARN Guidelines [64].
At the end of 2014, the ACU EWARN covered a re-
ported population of 10,003,000, reporting from 321 out
of a possible 335 sentinel health facilities in nine of the
14 Syrian governorates; and had generated 3502 alerts
(see Table 1). Confirmed disease outbreaks identified by
the ACU EWARN since 2013 included poliomyelitis,
acute jaundice syndrome, typhoid and measles. Data
were published on social media and the web (http://
www.acu-sy.org/en/) [65, 66].
The Syrian MoH, supported by WHO Syria, also oper-
ated a disease Early Warning System (called EWARS)
which started in September 2012, reporting in 104 out
of a possible 650 sentinel facilities in 14 Syrian governor-
ates by late 2014 (Table 1) [67]. Data were also analysed
on a weekly basis, and published online [68]. Both
EWARN and EWARS were simplified disease surveillance
systems set up in response to the conflict, monitoring a
limited number of priority epidemic-prone diseases using
syndromic definitions, such as acute jaundice, acute diar-
rhoea and measles. The failure to harmonise these surveil-
lance systems due to lack of coordination between
contested and opposition-held areas of Syria, versus Gov-
ernment of Syria controlled areas inevitably meant that
case ascertainment and reporting were being duplicated in
2014, although we do not know to what extent this was
the case. In addition, case definitions and alerts were not
shared between the two systems. There were also differ-
ences in diseases covered; for example, cutaneous leish-
maniasis was not reported by the MoH EWARS, but was
added to EWARN following reports of much-increased in-
cidence (Syria is one of the most affected countries, and
Aleppo the most highly endemic city worldwide) [69, 70].
Despite regular and timely reporting, the ACU
EWARN lacked resources and authority to investigate
and respond to alerts generated by the system, especially
in areas where neither the Syrian MoH nor the Interim
Government MoH were functioning. Thus, alarming epi-
demic alerts, such as large numbers of measles cases,
were not followed by an appropriate public health re-
sponse. The EWARN announced an outbreak of Measles
since the 4th week of 2014, reporting between 100 and
150 cases of measles weekly (in the week 29/2014 there
were 145 cases of measles were reported by EWARN),
and yet there was no effective response as EWARN
lacked capacity. Other diseases such as acute bronchio-
litis, whooping cough, acute diarrhoea, brucellosis, cuta-
neous leishmaniasis and typhoid were being reported
and also lacked an appropriate response due to lack of
ACU capacity. This meant that results were not used in
a timely manner despite having set up a comprehensive
system at the outset of the conflict. Inorder to maximise
usability of data in an extraordinatorily complex system
Table 1 Summary of epidemic alerts generated by the ACU
EWARN in 2014
Syndrome Number of alerts
Acute bloody diarrhoea 125
Acute watery diarrhoea 0
Acute jaundice syndrome 642
Severe acute respiratory infection 113
Acute flaccid paralysis 65
Measles 1003
Meningitis 20
Unexplained cluster of events 101
Unexplained death 45
Fever of unknown origin 344
Leishmaniasis 74
Suspected typhoid fever 970
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as described here, the ACU and similar organisations
should perhaps have been supported by an entirely inde-
pendent specialised agency with technical expertise to
respond to such epidemics most effectively.
Disease burden: Non-communicable diseases and mental
disorders
Before the conflict, some studies suggest that adults in
Syria had the highest prevalence of cardiovascular dis-
ease risk factors in the world, with 45.6% for hyperten-
sion, 43.2% for obesity, 21.9% for hypercholesterolemia
and 15.6% for diabetes [71–73]. Despite these alarming
trends, reliable surveillance of cardiovascular disease and
its risk factors was absent in Syria suggesting weak base-
line data. The Syrian Center for Tobacco Studies, had
begun efforts to provide the first comprehensive assess-
ment of the spread and distribution of cardiovascular
disease risk factors in Syria but this was stymied by the
conflict [71].
Reports suggest that there have been a projected
300,000 deaths due to chronic non-communicable dis-
eases (NCDs) in Syria since the beginning of the conflict,
due to widespread discontinuation of treatment [3]. Data
on the burden of NCDs and the extent of unmet treat-
ment need were not collected systematically through a
Health Information System, nor to our knowledge was
there an attempt to identify and register patients in need
of treatment continuation, as recommended [57].
Information about mental disorders and services
should be collected through a desk review of available re-
ports, including pre-war burden estimates, supplemented
by participatory assessments, and data gathered through
general health assessments and Health Resources and
Services Availability Mapping System (HeRAMS) (see
below) [57]. In contested and opposition-held areas of
Syria, there were no systematic efforts to compose a gen-
eral picture of the burden of mental disorders, partly due
to limited capacity to provide services both before and
during the conflict [74, 75]. Both the 2014 HeRAMS and
2009 Syrian Household Survey were not specific in terms
of mental disorder categorization.
We attempted to illuminate the importance of the
chronic disease information gap by estimating the per-
centage and number of NCD and mental disorder cases
not receiving treatment (treatment gap) as of October
2014 (Table 2). To do this, we projected caseload by
multiplying the available population figures for contested
and opposition-areas of Syria by pre-war estimates of
the prevalence of the main NCDs (diabetes, hypertension)
and mental disorders [51]. We present two scenarios,
based on a 2009 Syria-wide survey and regional estimates,
respectively (see sources in Table 2). We roughly approxi-
mated access to treatment using as a proxy the percentage
of health facilities within this population that reported
functionality of services to manage NCDs and mental dis-
orders, as collected by a Health Resources and Services
Availability Mapping System (HeRAMS) survey [76] (see
below). We multiplied this percentage by the projected
caseload to compute the number receiving treatment.
Taking a cautious approach, these estimates assume
that the war did not result in an increased prevalence
(in reality, there is strong evidence that the prevalence
of mental disorders such as depression and particularly
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) increase as a re-
sult of war conditions [77, 78]), and are subject to fur-
ther bias resulting from the incomplete coverage of
HeRAMS data collection (see below), and the possible
disconnect between availability of services and actual
access to care, e.g. due to insecurity. Nevertheless, our
estimates suggest a large treatment gap in contested
Table 2 Estimated treatment gap for common NCDs and mental disorders in, 2013
Disease Prevalence estimate (source) In need of treatment Receiving treatment Treatment gap (%)
Diabetesa 1.8% (Syrian National Household Survey, 2009) 281,000 45,000 236,000
(84%)
12.1% (regional average, 2014) 1,872,000 300,000 1,573,000
(84%)
Hypertensionb 2.3% (Syrian National Household Survey, 2009) 359,000 25,000 327,000
(91%)
41% (regional average, 2010) 3,511,000 (6,396,920) 316,000
(575,723)
3,195,000
(5,821,197)
(91%)
Depressionc 0.4% (Syrian National Household Survey, 2009) 62,000 47,000 16,000
(75%)
(14.95%) (regional average, 2011) (2,332,535) 1,749,402 583,134
(75%)
Information sources:
aDiabetes- regional average for 2014 [104–106]
bHypertension- regional average for 2010 for data from Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia [106, 107]
cDepression - an average of Lebanon, Egypt, Pakistan, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Iraq [108]
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and opposition-held areas of Syria, with most cases go-
ing without treatment, as opposed to the 14% gap in
continuous treatment estimated for 2009.
To our knowledge no such projections of treatment gap
were made in real-time during 2013–2014, despite the
availability of pre-conflict prevalence data; this should be-
come an essential health information exercise, directly
informing the public health response [24, 79]
While we present data on the estimated NCD and
mental health burdens, we acknowledge that we do not
present data on key maternal health outcomes such as
maternal and neonatal mortality. The inclusion of the
former are intended as examples and future data should
include analysis of other critical health outcomes such as
reproductive health, and key health risk factors such as
access to safe water supplies and sanitation.
Public health services The Health Resources and
Services Availability Mapping System (HeRAMS) is a
standardized approach supported by a software-based
platform that aims to strengthen the collection, collation
and analysis of information on the availability of health
resources and services in humanitarian emergencies
[80]. HeRAMS surveys all health facilities and assesses
their functionality status, accessibility, health infrastruc-
ture, human resources, availability of different health
services, equipment, and medicines at primary and sec-
ondary care level. A Syria-wide HeRAMS survey was ini-
tiated by the Syrian MoH and WHO in early 2013.
Results, however, were only made available in April 2014
[81]. The survey showed that the conflict had resulted in
enormous losses of health staff, and severely reduced
medical supply routes. It also suggested that 43% of ac-
cessible public hospitals and 21% of accessible public
primary health facilities were completely or partially
damaged, resulting in areas with no access to health care
[76, 82].
This first HeRAMS exercise was of limited use for
agencies working in contested and opposition-held areas
of Syria, since only governorate-level aggregate results
were made available: data for individual health facilities
were not shared, and the survey’s coverage in contested
and opposition-held areas was suspected to be low [83].
Thus, a separate HeRAMS was initiated by the HWG in
Turkey in July and August 2015, with data for
opposition-held and contested areas of Syria on the
availability of basic health services (Table 3) [84]. This
exercise was rendered arduous by the need to establish a
de novo database of health facilities, given no pre-conflict
health system data were available from the Syrian MoH.
As a less data-intensive, more frequently updated al-
ternative to HeRAMS, the HWG maintained a 4 W
(Who is doing What, Where and When) database, in-
cluding broad information on each agency’s areas of
service delivery (e.g. reproductive health, surgery, etc.).
However, strict information sharing protocols dictated
by security concerns (e.g. possible targeting by combat-
ants if agencies’ locations of operation were disclosed)
meant that only aggregated results for each governorate
could be published, with no public detail on what each
agency was doing where. This constrained identification
and response to priority geographic and service area
gaps in service provision. For example, during the prepa-
rations for both the measles and polio vaccination cam-
paigns in 2014, UN agencies, cross-border NGOs, the
Syrian MoH in Damascus, NGOs working in GoS areas,
and the interim MoH in opposition-held and contested
areas all conducted largely overlapping micro-planning
for the campaigns, based on information available to
them [85]. Multiple vaccination of the same children
was commonly reported. Independent campaign moni-
toring was performed by the Qatari Red Crescent, but
agencies responsible for vaccination were not given ac-
cess to monitoring data for their operational areas. Vac-
cination coverage was estimated by the ACU using the
administrative method [86], which is commonly biased
by over-reporting of vaccination outputs and inaccuracy
in target population denominators [57].
With the exception of vaccination campaigns, we are
not aware of other systematic efforts to quantify utilisa-
tion of health services in contested and opposition-held
areas of Syria, for which the Sphere Guidelines specify
clear standards [87]. While different agencies were col-
lecting various coverage and utilisation data in their
catchment areas, a uniform Health Information System,
combined with population figures, would have provided
an overall picture of service utilisation, indicating the ac-
tual extent of health care access.
Population mortality In contested and opposition-held
areas of Syria, opportunities to collect all-cause popula-
tion mortality data through joint rapid needs assess-
ments were tested. Specifically, assessment teams asked
key informants (e.g. community leaders) to compile
death counts from available sources, including Syrian
Arab Red Crescent lists, hospital data, local council re-
cords and lists provided by combatants. Mortality and
injury counts provided by key informants in contested
and opposition-held areas of Syria between January and
April 2013 recorded a total of 144,272 deaths and
injuries (Table 4). Mortality data were not collected in
this way after April 2013, as they were not considered a
priority for decision-making. Standard mortality surveys
were also not carried out, and judged unfeasible for se-
curity reasons.
Separately, Syrian and international civil society orga-
nisations, news agencies, and the Syrian government
have all collected data on people killed, mainly for
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advocacy and documentation, rather than public health
purposes, in many cases publishing nominal lists with
extensive detail on circumstances of death [88]. These
disparate sources were subjected to extensive cleaning
and multiple records linkage by the Human Rights Data
Analysis Group, on behalf of the Offices of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),
to generate a minimum credible number of violent
Table 3 Availability of basic health services in % of facilities offering the service, by level of healthcare, July–August 2015
Level of health care / Type of health service Primary health care Secondary health care Tertiary health care Total
Outreach activities within the community
Health education 43.6 18.9 43.2 37.8
Screening for malnutrition with MUAC 27.5 18.9 13.6 23.2
Follow up of malnourished children 30.4 39.6 18.2 30.2
Pregnancy screening for referral to ANC 36.9 39.6 27.3 35.8
Screening and referral of non-vaccinated children 28.2 28.3 11.4 24.8
Out Patient services
Outpatient services 63.1 83 70.5 68.7
Basic Laboratory Services 30.2 84.9 47.7 45.1
Basic Imaging Service 15.4 79.2 50 35.4
Surgery
Primary Injury care 52.3 86.8 38.6 57.3
Emergency surgery 17.4 73.6 43.2 34.1
Elective surgery 12.8 75.5 40.9 31.3
Intensive care unit 4.7 32.1 11.4 11.8
Basic blood bank service 6.7 49.1 29.5 19.9
Comprehensive blood bank service 0.7 7.5 11.4 3.7
Post-operative care 24.8 77.4 45.5 39.8
Child health
EPI 17.2 13.2 2.3 13.6
Screening for acute malnutrition (SAM) 22.1 28.3 18.2 22.8
Outpatient treatment of SAM 24.2 45.3 22.7 28.5
Stabilization Centre for the management of Severe
Acute Malnutrition
8.1 15.1 18.2 11.4
Basic Child Care (IMCI) 28.4 32.1 29.5 29.4
Management of children suffering from severe and
very severe illness
37.6 57.7 34.1 41.2
Communicable diseases
Treatment of measles 49.7 56.6 34.1 48.4
Treatment of cholera 25.5 35.8 31.8 28.9
Treatment of acute bloody diarrhoea 54.7 67.9 38.6 54.7
Treatment of acute watery diarrhoea 58.4 67.9 38.6 56.9
Treatment of Typhoid and Brucellosis 57.7 73.6 34.1 56.9
Treatment of Rabies 16.1 15.1 6.8 14.6
Treatment of leishmaniasis 73.8 56.6 31.8 62.6
Diagnosis of Viral Hepatitis B&C 33.1 52.8 31.8 37.1
Treatment of Viral Hepatitis B&C 5.4 13.2 13.6 8.5
Diagnosis of TB locally or via referral 33.6 47.2 20.5 34.1
Treatment of TB 4.7 11.3 11.4 7.3
Source: Health Resources Availability Mapping System (HeRAMS) Health Facilities Report:
Health Cluster - Turkey: Assessment of 254 facilities in nine Governorates in Syria. July–August 2015,
2015: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/herams_report_-_final.pdf
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deaths [89–92]. While the completeness of available
registries is unknown, the extensive network of ground
informants and activist organisations, a feature of the
Syrian conflict, has probably contributed to documenting
violent mortality in Syria more extensively than in other
recent wars. However, accurate estimates of excess
mortality, including deaths caused indirectly by the
conflict, remain missing [93].
Discussion: Key lessons from Syria
Information sharing
Strict information sharing protocols were implemented
to allay security and authorisation concerns of agencies
working cross-border and from GoS-held areas. How-
ever, these agencies were reluctant to share information
with WHO, for fear of leakage to the GoS. As a conse-
quence, very little useful information was shared, se-
verely curtailing coordination and strategic planning.
Data on locations of health facilities and programmes is
often used for direct targeting by combatants on health
workers and health care more broadly as illustrated by
attacks in Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, and several other
conflict-affected settings [94–96]. In future conflict set-
tings, health information could be managed by an en-
tirely independent specialised agency [97].
Population denominators
Uncertainty about population denominators impeded
meaningful analysis of health data (e.g. coverage indica-
tors) and accurate service delivery planning (e.g. for vac-
cination campaigns or pharmaceutical procurement).
Denominator uncertainty was due to a i) a high level of
internal and external displacement and the limited cap-
acity to monitor in- and out-flows across borders and
different facility catchment areas; ii) the collapse of pre-
war statistical services; iii) out-dated census figures
(2004); and iv) a potential bias of key informants asked to
provide population figures (inflation of figures to maximise
relief rations is a known phenomenon in humanitarian set-
tings). More investment should be made into establishing a
Table 4 Mortality and injury counts provided by key informants in contested and opposition areas of Syria, January and April 2013
January 2013 April 2013 Grand total
(dead + injured)Variable Governorate Dead Injured Total Dead Injured Total
Children <5y old Al-Hassakeh 6 20 26 33 287 320 346
Aleppo 135 658 793 739 4227 4966 5759
Ar-Raqqa 18 0 18 123 535 658 676
Deir-ez-Zor 136 606 742 491 1857 2348 3090
Hama n/a n/a n/a 304 1535 1839 1839
Idleb 1003 1112 2115 527 3207 3734 5849
Lattakia 19 275 294 13 43 56 350
Total 1317 2671 3988 2230 11,691 13,921 17,909
Female ≥5y old Al-Hassakeh 5 15 20 36 89 125 145
Aleppo 257 1747 2004 770 5880 6650 8654
Ar-Raqqa 29 26 55 132 1031 1163 1218
Deir-ez-Zor 446 1407 1853 385 1346 1731 3584
Hama n/a n/a n/a 248 1905 2153 2153
Idleb 892 690 1582 450 1991 2441 4023
Lattakia 33 325 358 29 25 54 412
Total 1662 4210 5872 2050 12,267 14,317 20,189
Male ≥5y old Al-Hassakeh 81 51 132 444 583 1027 1159
Aleppo 1277 6201 7478 3778 19,642 23,420 30,898
Ar-Raqqa 370 244 614 1637 2701 4338 4952
Deir-ez-Zor 2760 18,027 20,787 3726 8107 11,833 32,620
Hama n/a n/a n/a 2879 13,736 16,615 16,615
Idleb 2608 3209 5817 3615 7616 11,231 17,048
Lattakia 446 1650 2096 236 550 786 2882
Total 7542 29,382 36,924 16,315 52,935 69,250 106,174
Column grand totals 10,521 36,263 46,784 20,595 76,893 97,488 144,272
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regularly updated reference point in order to have baseline
data to work from [98]. In order to have a clearer under-
standing of population health needs, greater investment
should be made into improving the quality of essential
baseline data such as population denominators.
E-health and m-health opportunities
Most data were collected remotely, making it difficult to
check reliability. Mobile messaging apps such as
Whatsapp were popular forms of communication, but
transferring large documents via this medium was diffi-
cult and dependent on intermittently functioning mobile
networks. As collection of data via soft and hard com-
puter files were deemed to be unsafe to due to risk of
interception, data were also often collected by commit-
ting information to memory. In effect this could have
led to a high risk of recall bias. It is expected that mod-
ern technology will provide an unprecedented ability to
monitor, detect, and respond to crises in similar settings
such as Iraq, Libya, Ukraine where social media use,
cell-phone and internet connectivity is growing rapidly
[14, 99]. Further investment and preparedness into solu-
tions involving mobile phone software should be made.
Field assessments can be conducted via mobile phones
using free technology similar to limesurvey, and data can
be relayed to servers for quick analysis and a fast response
[100, 101]. Investment must continue into key e-health
tools such as DHIS2 (Health Management Information
Systems) and tele-reporting to ensure preparedness for
use in all contexts allowing for appropriate language cap-
acity. This will encourage and reassure professionals on
the ground that it is worth utilising and discourage devel-
opment of incompatible systems at field level.
Agencies’ capacity for data collection
Throughout 2013–14, NGOs on the ground were en-
tirely responsible for health data collection and analysis,
without support from WHO. Coordination staff were
very limited, and staff turnover was high, resulting in
discontinuity of planning and delays between data col-
lection and action. For example, much effort went into
repeated cross-sectional needs assessments, rather than
setting up functional prospective systems such as HIS.
Syrian NGOs, arguably the best placed for data collec-
tion due to their capillary presence inside Syria and high
motivation, faced language barriers and had limited op-
portunities for on-site training on health information
methods.
Coordination mechanisms should be staffed with
stable teams, including specialists in health informa-
tion methods, backed up by technical networks for
distance support, e.g. from WHO, the Centers for
Disease Control and academic centres of excellence.
Real-time training of agencies, particularly local
entities, in methods and ethical provisions of health
data collection should be a consistent function of
health clusters and other coordination mechanisms.
Conclusion
In September 2014, the Whole of Syria approach was
adopted to bring together the cross-border humanitarian
assistance from Turkey and Jordan into a single frame-
work [102]. This appears to be improving efficiency and
may ensure greater accountability, effectiveness and reach.
Clusters have been activated in cross-border responses
and the three hubs (Damascus in Syria, Amman in Jordan
and Gaziantep in Turkey) are working together to ensure
that health needs are jointly assessed with priorities identi-
fied, and health information is promptly shared. The UN
is now more engaged, and there has been a move toward
creating common data collection systems such as
EWARN and HeRAMS between the Government of Syria
and the contested and opposition-held areas of the coun-
try. However, the conflict continues to worsen with grow-
ing barriers to the delivery of aid, high levels of insecurity,
and the fragmentation and radicalization of armed groups
in many areas of Syria [103].
Reliable and timely information to support evidence
based decision-making to respond to the health crisis
among Syrians remains far from ideal, but has improved
over time. There is no doubt that humanitarian agencies
encountered many challenges in collecting health data in
Syria from 2013 to 2014. These included having to main-
tain strict information sharing protocols, limited sharing
of data, duplication of key activities, lack of leadership
and coordination, limited NGO capacity and little UN
support. We call for a much greater focus on health data
within Syria and similar conflicts, and greater engage-
ment by international donors to support this work.
Although this paper provides a limited snapshot of the
health status in Syria, it raises key points about the need
for more health data within Syria and within other hu-
manitarian crises. In future conflict-affected settings,
health information could perhaps be managed by an
entirely independent specialised agency, and better in-
vestment in E- and M-health should be a priority given
the growing security and governance challenges in Syria
and elsewhere.
Key messages
 Between 2013 and 2014, access for humanitarian aid
to contested and opposition-held areas of Syria was
severely hindered by insecurity, the Government of
Syria and lack of leadership from the United Nations
 Humanitarian needs have consistently been most
acute in contested and opposition-held areas of Syria
due to breakdown of Government of Syria services
and intense warfare
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 Humanitarian organisations had to establish de novo
data collection systems independent of the
Government of Syria to provide essential services in
opposition-held and contested areas of Syria
 The use of technology such as social media was vital
to facilitating remote data collection in Syria as
many humanitarian agencies operated with a limited
operational visibility given chronic levels of insecurity
 Mortality data have been highly politicized and
extremely difficult to verify, particularly in areas
highly affected by the conflict, with shifting
frontlines, populations, and allegiances
 Much more attention should be given for the
treatment gap for non-communicable diseases
including mental disorders
 More investment in data collection and use,
technological investment in the use of M and
E-health, capacity building and strong technical
and independent leadership should be a key priority
for the humanitarian health response in Syria and
other emergencies
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